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When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
entered into force 15 years ago, environmental issues were an 
afterthought appended to a side accord, the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). Today, 
environmental  problems  loom  large  on  the  global  agenda, 
and climate change, in particular, ranks among the top issues 
on the North American agenda as the leaders of the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico convene in Guadalajara in August 
2009. This policy brief examines the implications for NAFTA 
of national policies in the three countries to reduce green-
house gas (GHG) emissions and suggests steps that the part-
ner countries can take together to further both their economic 
and environmental goals.
Starting from Behind
Climate change issues were not on the radar of the trade offi-
cials who negotiated the NAFTA in the early 1990s. During 
NAFTA’s early formative years, the issue was only briefly vetted 
in the NAAEC’s Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
while the three countries participated in the drafting of the 
Kyoto  Protocol,  which  committed  developed  countries  to 
begin to lower their aggregate emissions and to help develop-
ing countries develop and finance GHG mitigation strategies. 
The nascent NAAEC initiatives foundered amid strong oppo-
sition in the US Congress to the Kyoto Protocol.1 Neither the 
Clinton nor the Bush administrations submitted the treaty 
for ratification. Canada did ratify the Kyoto Protocol, but its 
subsequent actions on climate change have been very limited. 
Absent federal action, various US states and Canadian 
provinces pursued their own climate change policies (Fickling 
2009). These have not been sufficient, however, to stem large 
emissions increases in all three NAFTA countries. In the United 
States, GHG emissions rose by 17 percent between 1990 and 
2005. Canada’s performance was even worse, a 26 percent 
increase  over  1990  levels.  Mexico’s  emissions,  though  still 
low on a per capita basis, increased by 37 percent during the 
same period (table 1). All three NAFTA countries, therefore, 
have much lost ground to recover—a task made all the more 
difficult given the current sharp economic downturn. 
Fortunately, all three countries now recognize the impera-
tive to start the long-term process of substantially reducing 
GHG  emissions.  President  Obama  ranks  climate  change 
among his top priorities. The US House of Representatives 
has already passed the American Climate and Energy Security 
Act (ACESA)—sponsored by House Energy and Commerce 
Committee Chairman Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Represen-
tative Edward Markey (D-MA)—by a narrow vote (219-212). 
This legislation sets out emissions targets likely to be included 
in the final bill that emerges from the Senate-House confer-
ence. The overall goal of the United States under ACESA is to 
reduce emissions 20 percent from 2005 levels by 2020 and 83 
percent from 2005 levels by 2050. In comparison, Canada’s 
current  climate  change  plan, Turning  the  Corner,  aims  to 
reduce emissions 20 percent below 2006 levels by 2020 and 
1. Although the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol, the Byrd-Hagel 
Resolution passed by the Senate in July 1997 by a vote of 95-0 clearly indi-
cated that the treaty as negotiated would fail in Congress.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 8     a u g u s t   2 0 0 9
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70 percent below 2006 levels by 2050. However, Canada is 
waiting to see what the United States does on climate change 
before  implementing  its  plan  (which  will  probably  closely 
approximate the US policy). Mexico also has set ambitious 
targets for GHG mitigation, committing in December 2008 
to reduce emissions 50 percent below 2002 levels by 2050. 
managing regional differenceS
The success or failure of climate policy in all three countries 
ultimately depends on the ability of regional economies to 
adapt to the policy. Due to disparate energy sources, indus-
trial concentrations, and political economy, countries, states, 
and provinces face various challenges in creating politically 
viable, environmentally sound climate policies with minimal 
economic dislocation.
Sources of energy differ widely both among and within 
countries. Overall, the United States relies most heavily on the 
most  carbon-intensive  electricity  production  method,  coal, 
which comprises about half of American electricity. Mexico 
also relies heavily on fossil fuels, obtaining 55 percent of its 
electricity from petroleum and 32 percent from natural gas. 
Canada is the only country of the three that currently gets a 
large share of its electricity, almost 60 percent, from hydro-
power.2 
Fossil fuel extraction and use tend to be concentrated in 
certain regions in the United States and Canada. US states such 
as Wyoming and West Virginia generate more than 95 percent 
of electricity from coal; others, such as Maine and California, 
generate 2 percent or less electricity from coal. The spread of 
electricity sources is just as stark in Canada. While Alberta 
relies on coal-fired electricity for almost three-fourths of its 
generation, provinces such as British Columbia and Manitoba 
derive over 90 percent of their electricity from hydropower. 
2. Data are from Energy Information Administration and Statistics Canada.
Among US regions, carbon-intensive industries comprise 
a greater percentage of GDP and employment in the midwest 
and the southeast (Fickling and Schott, forthcoming). Coal 
extraction is a major source of revenue in Appalachian states 
such as West Virginia. Not surprisingly, congressional repre-
sentatives  from  the  midwest  and  the  south  tend  to  take  a 
pessimistic view of the effect of carbon pricing on their states’ 
economies. Similar regional differences complicate Canadian 
politics; some provinces such as Alberta and Saskatchewan 
depend heavily on oil production for economic growth and 
thus have sharply different priorities with regard to mitigat-
ing GHG emissions than eastern provinces (Government of 
Saskatchewan 2008).
In the United States, the Democratic Congress and Presi-
dent Obama recognize the need to drastically reduce GHGs 
over the long run. However, they face strong political pressure 
to avoid sharp price increases for energy and energy-intensive 
products that would hurt consumers and damage the competi-
tiveness of local industries. Regional differences exacerbate this 
problem. Thus the big challenge facing political leaders is how 
to design climate policies that limit costs to consumers and 
industry without significantly dampening incentives to adapt 
and conserve. At this point in the US legislative process, poli-
ticians are still struggling to find a delicate balance between 
securing enough political support for passage and maintaining 
the environmental integrity of the legislation. 
Canadian policy faces cross-cutting environmental and 
economic interests pitting climate change objectives against 
the exploitation of natural resources, especially oil sands. In 
both areas, Canadian officials are concerned that their policies 
may create frictions with their NAFTA partners that could 
affect regional trade and investment. The Harper administra-
tion wants to encourage development of Alberta’s oil sands 
resources  and  has  been  concerned  about  California’s  low 
carbon fuel standard, which could potentially have a major 
impact on Alberta if widely adopted. While US legislation 
initially  included  a  (weak)  national  low  carbon  fuel  stan-
dard, the measure was subsequently dropped.3 The Canadian 
National Round Table on Energy and the Environment (2009) 
recently warned that Canada could face ruinous protection-
ism if it did not adopt a climate policy similar to that of its 
southern neighbor. This is a key reason for Canadian interest 
in coordinating with the United States on energy and climate 
change policies.
In contrast to its northern neighbors, Mexico’s top prior-
ity  is  to  cut  GHG  emissions  from  transportation,  which 
3. Sheldon Alberts, “US Climate Bill Would Be ‘Disaster,’”National Post 
(online edition), May 14, 2009, available at www.nationalpost.com (accessed 
on July 30, 2009).
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make up the largest part of its sectoral emissions portfolio (34 
percent) (IEA 2008). In addition, Mexico is focused on reduc-
ing  methane  emitted  by  state-owned  petroleum  company 
PEMEX and wastewater treatment plants. While Mexico has 
set aggressive goals compared with other developing countries, 
meeting these goals will require it to overcome considerable 
capacity  and  financial  constraints.  Mexico  would  benefit 
from both bilateral technical and financial assistance from its 
NAFTA partners, as well as from the development of an inte-
grated North American climate regime that would ensure that 
environmentally sound Mexican projects qualify to sell carbon 
credits to the other two countries. 
common north american intereStS
Despite the challenges, the three NAFTA partners have mutual 
interests in harmonizing climate policy. They share a common 
environment and a long history of environmental coopera-
tion. The United States and Canada have signed acid rain and 
transboundary smog agreements, and the United States and 
Mexico have several border environmental and water compacts 
such as the International Boundary and Water Commission. 
More recently, the North American Development Bank has 
provided funding and coordination for environmental infra-
structure in the US-Mexico border region. 
The NAFTA region also has an interdependent but not 
fully  integrated  energy  market.  How  energy  is  produced, 
used, and traded has a large impact on GHG emissions and 
affects how each country can adapt to a low-carbon future. 
The United States is a major consumer of petroleum; Canada 
and Mexico are major US suppliers. Almost 30 percent of 
US oil comes from North America, and in 2007, about 70 
percent  of  the  crude  oil  produced  in  Canada  was  shipped 
to the United States. Trade in energy totaled almost $100 
billion between the United States and Canada and almost $10 
billion between the United States and Mexico in 2007.4 Given 
their strong energy interdependence, US decisions that affect 
energy consumption will have a heavy impact on Canada and 
Mexico. Likewise, decisions made in Canada and Mexico that 
affect energy production will impact the US economy. 
While  Canadian  electricity  does  not  make  up  a  large 
portion  of  most  US  states’  electricity  portfolios,  it  does 
comprise a major percentage of total consumption in a few 
border states. Vermont obtains almost 40 percent of electricity 
consumed from Quebec, and North Dakota and Minnesota 
obtain more than 10 percent of electricity consumed from 
Manitoba. US exports are less significant to Canadian provin-
4. Data are from Energy Information Administration and Statistics Canada.
cial  electricity  supply;  the  exception  is  British  Columbia, 
which gets almost 10 percent of its electricity supply from 
American states.5 
In  addition,  the  North  American  countries  share  a 
common interest in minimizing policies that distort North 
American  trade  and  investment.  But  the  climate  change 
debate  has  raised  competitiveness  concerns  and  prompted 
calls for border adjustments to offset the impact of climate 
policies on domestic firms. Interestingly, politicians and the 
public  worry  that  pricing  carbon  could  put  US  firms  and 
workers at a competitive disadvantage against China and other 
Asian countries; in fact, however, most US imports of carbon-
intensive goods come from Canada.6 Thus, much is at stake 
for both countries in harmonizing policy in order to prevent 
trade-related border carbon measures. 
Finally, there is already several billion dollars’ worth of 
trade in environmental goods between the United States and 
Canada and between the United States and Mexico. Under 
a carbon-constrained economy, all three countries stand to 
gain from expanding this trade—both in North America and 
abroad.7
US Policy: Before and after 2009
Before 2009, US climate policy was largely pursued by indi-
vidual  states,  many  following  precedents  of  performance 
standards set by California. Thirty states adopted a renewable 
portfolio standard, and seventeen states committed to adopt-
ing automobile emissions standards that would produce fuel 
economy improvements in excess of federal regulation. Many 
states also implemented energy efficiency measures. 
These policies were developed in the face of federal inac-
tion on climate change. During the negotiation of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the US Congress had indicated its unwillingness to 
ratify a treaty to reduce GHGs unless developing countries 
such as China and India made similar commitments. Subse-
quently, the Bush administration followed a permissive envi-
ronmental agenda regarding regulation of CO2 as a pollutant 
and  blocked  states  from  implementing  stricter  automobile 
standards.  Overall  US  GHG  emissions  increased  despite 
increased energy efficiency. 
5. Data are from Energy Information Administration, Statistics Canada, and 
National Energy Board.
6. These include steel, cement, paper, and aluminum.  Canada is also the 
number two exporter of chemicals, behind Trinidad and Tobago.  See 
Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim (2009).
7. UNCTAD TRAINS Database via World Integrated Trade Solution, 2009.  
Based on the list of environmental goods (at 6-digit HS level) compiled by the 
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With  the  entrance  of  the  Obama  administration,  this 
dynamic appears to have changed dramatically. The admin-
istration  has  pushed  for  passage  of  ACESA,  directed  the 
National Highway Transportation Safety Authority to raise 
fuel economy standards to California levels, and issued an 
endangerment finding for CO2. Since ACESA will likely set 
the tone and framework for US climate policy over the next 
decade, we now turn to a discussion of its main provisions and 
implications for policy across the region. 
aceSa aS a framework for US Policy: 
dramatic change of coUrSe
Unlike previous legislation proposed in Congress, ACESA is far 
more than a cap and trade bill. Rather, it is more of an “omni-
bus climate bill” that covers renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
building efficiency, automobiles, carbon capture and sequestra-
tion, and green jobs, in addition to a cap and trade program. 
Broadly, the bill sets out three main objectives: It cuts emis-
sions, alters the mix and use of energy sources, and subsidizes 
the economic transition to a low-carbon economy. Contrary 
to initial plans, however, the version of ACESA passed by the 
House will generate only minimal revenues for the Treasury and 
will not contribute to reducing the federal budget deficit. 
The bill’s overall goal is to reduce national GHG emis-
sions  3  percent  from  2005  levels  by  2012,  20  percent  by 
2020, 42 percent by 2030, and 83 percent by 2050. Mean-
while, the cap and trade program within this bill directs the 
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator to 
regulate emissions from covered sources such that they achieve 
a 3 percent reduction from 2005 levels by 2012, a 17 percent 
reduction by 2020, a 42 percent reduction by 2030, and an 
83 percent reduction by 2050. About 85 percent of total emis-
sions are covered under the cap and trade program. As not 
all emissions will be covered under cap and trade, additional 
reductions must come from parts of the bill not connected to 
the cap and trade program in order to achieve the economy-
wide goals of the bill. 
The bill also includes a renewable portfolio standard. Six 
percent  of  suppliers’  electricity  load  must  be  derived  from 
eligible sources and/or energy efficiency in 2012. This require-
ment escalates to 20 percent in 2020. Up to one-quarter of 
firms’  compliance  obligations  can  be  met  through  energy 
efficiency as opposed to renewable electricity, unless the US 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) upon peti-
tion increases the standard to two-fifths. Eligible renewable 
sources include wind, biomass, solar, geothermal, some hydro-
power, marine, and hydrokinetic energy. Other eligible energy 
sources  include  landfill  gas,  wastewater  treatment  gas,  coal 
mine methane, and qualified waste-to-energy. In addition, the 
standard is reduced in proportion to the portion of a supplier’s 
electricity sales that are generated from existing hydroelectric 
facilities, new nuclear facilities, and fossil fuel units that use 
carbon capture and storage. 
Most actions necessary for compliance with the bill 
will be subsidized via free allowances and auction revenues 
over the first decade or so. ACESA contains a plethora of 
rebates, tax credits, handouts, and allowance allocations that 
are intended to reduce the cost of the bill both to individual 
Americans and to industry. Allowances and auction revenues 
are mostly apportioned for three main purposes: to keep elec-
tricity prices low while transitioning to a less GHG-intensive, 
more efficient economy; to prevent adverse trade competi-
tiveness impacts on domestic industries; and to compensate 
low-income families for cost increases. While many of these 
allocations are probably necessary in order to garner politi-
cal support, some of them—particularly the rebates to trade-
vulnerable industries—could ultimately undermine the effi-
ciency of the bill. 
Most of the allowances created by ACESA will be allo-
cated,  not  auctioned.  About  70  percent  of  allowances  are 
allocated at the start of the program in 2012. This proportion 
increases to over 80 percent by 2016. The biggest increase in 
allocated allowances is in support for trade-vulnerable indus-
tries, which jumps from 2 percent of total allowances to 15 
percent in 2014. The largest portion of allowances goes toward 
mitigating electricity price increases; the percentage of the total 
number of allowances allocated to electricity consumers starts 
at 44 percent in 2012, decreasing to 35 percent by 2016. Most 
of these allowances are given to local distribution companies, 
which are mandated to pass on the savings to consumers in a 
lump-sum fashion. Based on EPA allowance price estimates, 
these allowances to electricity will be valued at $23 billion to 
$31 billion in 2012 and $28 to $37 billion in 2020. 
For the electricity sector, alternate compliance payments 
and allowance allocations have been put in place with the 
objective  of  minimizing  energy  price  increases  due  to  the 
cap and trade program and the renewable portfolio standard. 
ACESA is more of an “omnibus climate bill” 
that covers renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, building efficiency, automobiles, 
carbon capture and sequestration, and green 
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According to an EPA estimate, the average annual cost per 
household of ACESA in terms of reduced consumption will 
be between $98 and $140. Measures to reduce energy price 
increases  might  mitigate  the  bill’s  competitiveness  impacts 
for industry. To the extent that they also reduce incentives for 
end-use energy efficiency, however, they would force emissions 
abatement to come from elsewhere in the economy, poten-
tially decreasing the efficiency of the bill and increasing its 
total cost. 
About 10 percent of the total number of allowances will 
be allocated to state energy efficiency programs from 2012 to 
2015. Five percent of the total number of allowances will be 
allocated to supplemental emissions reductions from reduced 
deforestation.  EPA  and  the  US  Agency  for  International 
Development will administer these allowances to build capac-
ity in developing countries that are either being deforested or 
at risk of deforestation. Mexico could be the recipient of some 
of these allowances.
The  bulk  of  revenues  from  auctions  are  earmarked  to 
offset energy price increases for low-income consumers. Fifteen 
percent of the total number of allowances are earmarked for this 
purpose. This corresponds to an $8 billion to $11 billion rebate 
in 2012 and a $12 billion to $16 billion rebate in 2020. 
A maximum of 2 billion tons per year of emissions can 
be offset in any given year, according to the bill. Half of these 
offsets can be international. We estimate that allowable offsets 
could amount to 27 to 32 percent of the total compliance 
obligation  for  firms  between  2012  and  2025.  In  practice, 
however, that many certified offsets probably will not be avail-
able, particularly internationally. 
ACESA will reduce the budget deficit, although not by 
much. From 2012 to 2025, unaccounted-for allowances will 
be auctioned, and revenues will be deposited into the Treasury 
in order to reduce the budget deficit. Based on EPA estimates 
of allowance prices, our estimate of the cumulative budget 
deficit reduction due to this measure from 2010 to 2019 is 
between  $14  billion  and  $19  billion—most  of  which  will 
be accumulated in the first four years of the program, from 
2012 to 2015. The Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of 
ACESA’s overall effect on the budget is $9 billion in deficit 
reduction between 2010 and 2019.
When  President  Obama  first  submitted  his  budget 
proposal earlier in 2009, it assumed 100 percent auctioning 
of allowances under a cap and trade program. This budget 
projected $650 billion in revenues between 2010 and 2019, 
and some private estimates of potential cap and trade revenues 
were much higher. 
comPetitiveneSS meaSUreS Under aceSa
ACESA  includes  two  types  of  competitiveness  measures: 
allowance rebates and a border reserve allowance program. 
The rebates consist of allowances allocated to trade-vulner-
able industries to compensate for costs imposed by the bill, 
which are intended to keep US industries on an equal footing 
with industries in countries that do not adopt a cap and trade 
program. The international reserve allowance program, which 
is scheduled to be implemented later under certain conditions, 
could require importers to purchase allowances at the border 
for GHGs emitted during the manufacture of the imported 
products. Although some form of competitiveness provision 
is probably necessary to secure congressional support, these 
trade-related measures carry some risks. 
Under  the  allowance  rebate  program,  trade-vulnerable 
industries may receive a maximum of 15 percent of the total 
number of allowances created by the bill in 2014 and 2015 
and  13.4  percent  in  2016  and  thereafter. Trade-vulnerable 
industries are defined as having an energy- or GHG-intensity 
of at least 5 percent and a trade exposure of at least 15 percent. 
In addition, industries with very high energy- or GHG-inten-
sities—defined as an intensity of 20 percent or greater—are 
also  eligible  for  rebates.  By  2020,  these  allowances  could 
be worth $11 billion to $14 billion per year, based on EPA 
allowance price estimates. Allowances will be distributed on 
a  product-output  basis;  100  percent  compensation  will  be 
provided for both direct and indirect compliance costs based 
on average carbon intensity for the sector. Rebates are slated 
to end in 2035. Trevor Houser estimates that 35 industries 
would qualify.8 
In earlier drafts of the US legislation, only 85 percent 
of costs to trade-vulnerable industries were subsidized.  We 
8. An assessment of qualifying industries in a preliminary version of the bill 
can be found in Trevor Houser’s April 23, 2009 testimony to the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce of the US House of Representatives, Ensuring US 
Competitiveness and International Participation, available at www.piie.com. 
While the types of industries that qualify have changed slightly since this 
testimony, the number of qualifying industries has not. 
Congress and President Obama…face 
strong political pressure to avoid 
sharp price increases for energy and 
energy-intensive products that would 
hurt consumers and damage the 
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assume the members’ reasoning was that there is on average a 
30 percent spread of carbon intensities in affected industries. 
With an 85 percent subsidy, therefore, the least carbon-inten-
sive firms would have 100 percent of their costs subsidized; 
firms with average carbon intensities would have 85 percent 
of their costs subsidized; and the most carbon-intensive firms 
would have 60 percent of their costs subsidized. This proposal 
would have avoided over-rebating any firm. In the current 
version of the bill, however, firms with average carbon intensi-
ties will have 100 percent of their costs subsidized, and firms 
that are less carbon-intensive than average—half the industry 
in any given sector—will have over 100 percent of their costs 
subsidized.  The  least  carbon-intensive  firms  will  have  115 
percent of their costs subsidized. 
Starting in 2020, border adjustments may be imposed 
through an international allowance reserve program, accord-
ing  to  presidential  discretion.  These  adjustments  may  be 
implemented if less than 85 percent of imports in a sector 
come from countries that are deemed to have taken compa-
rable action under the bill. In order to meet the bill’s criteria 
for comparable action in a certain sector, countries must
n	 be party to an international treaty to which the United 
States is a party that includes a nationally enforceable emis-
sions reduction commitment at least as stringent as that of 
the United States or 
n	 be  party  to  a  sectoral  emissions  reduction  agreement 
including the United States or
n	 have a greenhouse gas intensity for the sector equal to or 
less than that of the United States. 
The following imports will be exempt from border allowance 
purchase requirements:
n	 imports from least developed countries, 
n	 imports from countries responsible for less than 0.5 percent 
of global emissions and less than 5 percent of US imports 
in the sector, and 
n	 imports  from  countries  that  have  taken  comparable 
action. 
These provisions are highly controversial, and it is not 
clear where they fall in terms of World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rules.9 There appears to be a consensus among trade 
experts that the rebate system is preferable to border adjust-
ments, although this consensus is not universal.10 The reason-
9. For a thorough discussion of WTO rules regarding border adjustments, see 
Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim (2009).
10. Paul Krugman, “Climate, Trade, Obama,” New York Times (blog post), 
ing is that border measures are a highly visible form of protec-
tionism and could thus lead to a downward spiral of tit-for-tat 
retaliatory trade measures. The Obama administration appears 
to share this view, cautioning lawmakers to be “very careful 
about sending any protectionist signals out there.”11 
On the other hand, it is not clear to us that the rebates 
are any less worrisome for the world trading system—and they 
could prove worse for the ultimate goal of reducing GHG emis-
sions. The rebates’ advantage is that they are a less visible form 
of protectionism and thus less likely to trigger countervailing 
measures. Because they are given out on a product-output 
basis,  however,  they  are  trade  distorting  and  could  create 
perverse incentives to produce more goods from the carbon-
intensive sectors receiving the rebates. Border measures would 
not create these perverse incentives. The rebates’ effects are not 
targeted; they disadvantage exports from all other countries, 
even those that have adopted climate change measures them-
selves. The over-rebates could also be challenged under the 
WTO as trade-distorting subsidies. 
imPlicationS of aceSa for north 
american trade and cooPeration
ACESA is over 1,400 pages long, but it still leaves some unan-
swered questions. One heretofore relatively unexplored topic is 
how ACESA will affect US trading partners in North America. 
In addition to the obvious impacts of trade competitiveness 
measures imposed at the border, the bill has implications for 
state-provincial cap and trade compacts, international electric-
ity trade, and Mexico’s bid to reduce emissions 50 percent by 
2050.
Due  to  the  federal  preemption  provisions  in  this  bill, 
multi-jurisdictional cap and trade agreements among US states 
and Canadian provinces—including the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI), the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), 
and Midwest Accord cap and trade systems—will have to be 
disbanded. Holders of allowances issued by California, RGGI, 
and  WCI  will  receive  federal  allowances  to  compensate, 
according to the average cost of the state allowances in the year 
they were issued. The above provision is limited to US hold-
ers only, however. It is yet unclear whether or how Canadian 
holders of allowances under the WCI will be compensated for 
the disbanding of the multi-jurisdictional trading system. 
In theory, renewable electricity transmitted from Canada 
June 29, 2009, available at http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com (accessed on 
July 30, 2009).
11. John M. Broder, “Obama Opposes Trade Sanctions in Climate Bill,” New 
York Times (online edition), June 28, 2009, available at www.nytimes.com 
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could help US border states meet ACESA’s renewable portfo-
lio standard requirements. Explicit domestic content require-
ments were removed from early state renewable standards. If 
the federal government follows this precedent, as seems likely, 
then Canadian electricity will be afforded national treatment 
under ACESA.12 
As we mentioned earlier, there is substantial cross-border 
electricity  transmission  between  Canadian  provinces  and 
northern US states. Vermont obtains almost 40 percent of 
electricity from Canada, and North Dakota, Minnesota, and 
Maine obtain more than 10 percent. More than half of Cana-
dian electricity—and the vast majority of Canadian renewable 
electricity—comes from large hydropower facilities. 
In order for hydropower to qualify as renewable electricity 
under the bill, however, it must result from additional capac-
ity or increased efficiency added after 1988, to a hydroelectric 
facility placed in service before 1988. It is questionable wheth-
er much of Canadian hydropower can meet this standard. The 
inclusion of Canadian hydropower as a qualifying renewable 
source  also  poses  regulatory  difficulties.  The  US  FERC  is 
responsible for certifying qualified hydropower under the bill, 
but FERC does not have jurisdiction over Canada. 
Even unqualified hydropower, however, can help a utility 
meet its renewable portfolio obligation. Unqualified hydro-
power, along with nuclear electricity and electricity generated 
using carbon capture and sequestration, is subtracted from a 
utility’s base generation amount. Thus, the more hydropower a 
utility uses, the less energy that utility is obligated to produce 
from renewable power.
Finally,  the  significant  portion  of  international  offsets 
allowed under ACESA could provide a channel for US support 
for GHG mitigation in Mexico. Used properly, offset markets 
can improve the environment, reduce deforestation, alleviate 
poverty, and lower the cost of abating climate change. However, 
offsets require rigorous monitoring, reporting, and verification 
in order to ensure that they represent genuine emissions reduc-
tions. Institutional cooperation could strengthen and expedite 
monitoring, reporting, and verification in North America. 
12. E-mail exchange with Jason Tolland, Environment and Energy Program 
Manager, Embassy of Canada, Washington.
oPPortUnitieS for north american 
cooPeration
We conclude with concrete steps that the three North Ameri-
can countries could pursue together to advance their national 
climate change objectives. Some require bilateral action; others 
are  specifically  linked  to  NAFTA  and  thus  are  necessarily 
trilateral in nature. Combined, they form a pragmatic NAFTA 
agenda for near-term action on climate change issues.
Use  the  Commission  for  Environmental  Cooperation 
(CEC)  as a clearinghouse for climate change–related data. 
The  CEC  is  underutilized  and  underfunded;  with  modest 
budgetary  increments,  it  could  play  a  significant  role  in 
NAFTA climate change initiatives by expanding its database 
on North American emissions and reporting on new climate 
initiatives and regulations in each country. In so doing, the 
CEC could become a North American clearinghouse for moni-
toring, reporting, and verification of carbon credits—issued 
under national or regional carbon regimes—that could lower 
transaction costs of offset projects among the three countries. 
Standardize definitions of renewable energy in Canada and 
the United States and coordinate their policies. Currently, 
definitions vary widely among states and provinces, complicat-
ing regulation of renewable electricity from across the border. 
The major differences between the US and Canada regula-
tions lie in the eligibility of hydropower to meet renewable 
standards, as well as the eligibility of nuclear facilities to meet 
zero-carbon requirements in provinces like Ontario. Several 
Canadian provinces generate most of their electricity from 
hydropower; many US states will face a challenge in meeting 
the Waxman-Markey bill’s renewable portfolio standard. Both 
sides should make virtue out of necessity and agree on how 
imported electricity should be credited and certified under 
renewable  portfolio  standards.  Border  states  and  provinces 
should continue to work toward zero-carbon energy genera-
tion through existing regional institutions.
Adopt a NAFTA peace clause. In the near term, trade measures 
or border adjustments should not be used to equalize costs 
between  domestic  and  foreign  producers,  as  these  measures 
are likely to be emulated or provoke retaliation in other coun-
tries. In order to handle competitiveness concerns that are not 
addressed through international climate negotiations, a frame-
work needs to be developed under the WTO so as not to give 
rise to litigation or to snowballing protectionism. Because such 
a framework would take a few years to develop, a temporary 
“peace clause” suspending border measures for a limited time 
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should be incorporated into US (and foreign) climate legisla-
tion in order to encourage WTO negotiating efforts. In addi-
tion, liberalization of environmental goods and services should 
be given higher priority in the Doha negotiations.13
Study options for coordinating or integrating the evolving 
carbon regimes in each country. Policies that impose similar 
costs on firms no matter where they are in North America 
would eliminate carbon leakage within the NAFTA area. In 
addition,  policy  coordination  could  facilitate  carbon  credit 
trading by ensuring that carbon credits in all three countries 
represent similar kinds of carbon reductions. Such a coordi-
nated policy would likely evolve from two separate but simi-
lar national cap and trade systems in the United States and 
Canada, with incentives for Mexican participation. 
Establish a “safe harbor” to shield climate change taxes and 
regulations from claims under the indirect takings provi-
sions of NAFTA Chapter 11. Chapter 11 requires govern-
ments to provide compensation to investors for measures that 
are “tantamount to expropriation.” To date, Chapter 11 cases 
have assumed a limited scope for environmental laws’ consti-
tuting  expropriation.  Climate  change  laws  will  most  likely 
have much broader economic effects than prior environmental 
legislation, and the scope of potential claims under NAFTA 
Chapter 11 due to climate change laws and regulations could 
be orders of magnitude greater than those filed in the past. The 
potential for such Chapter 11 litigation against climate change 
laws could slow the implementation of measures designed to 
mitigate GHG emissions as well as adversely affect flows of 
trade and investment in the region. 
Capacity building in Mexico is essential to North Ameri-
can coordination. NAFTA provides a unique opportunity for 
this. First, NAFTA facilitation of Mexican carbon offset sales 
13. A PIIE working paper (Adler et al. 2009) estimates that removing tariffs 
on environmental goods could increase world trade by about $8 billion. 
could potentially generate revenue that could be put toward 
climate change measures in Mexico. Second, the North Ameri-
can Development Bank should be used to provide finance and 
technical assistance for energy-saving and pollution control 
projects in Mexico in support of its ambitious climate change 
policies. 
In addition to these recommendations, the North Ameri-
can countries might consider harmonizing emissions standards 
or  establishing  a  North  American  carbon  trading  regime. 
North American cooperation could serve as a model for how 
developed and developing countries can mutually benefit from 
an international climate change agreement.
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